Cryptography Resilient to Memory Attacks
Adi Akavia, Weizmann Institute
The security of various cryptosystems in common use has been completely
compromised by "side channel attacks", namely, by attacks exploiting
leakage of information on the underlying secret keys. Such information
leakage typically emanates from physical characteristics inevitably
involved in real-world implementations of cryptographic protocols (say,
power consumption, timing, or electro-magnetic radiation).
In this talk I will discuss *leakage resilient cryptography* –
cryptographic protocols protecting against such side channel attacks. I
will focus on the _bounded memory leakage model_ (with Goldwasser and
Vaikuntanathan), a model capturing a large class of side channel attacks
that laid the foundations for many follow-up works on leakage resilient
cryptography. In this model the attacker can learn any (efficiently
computable) function of the secret key, as long as its output length is
bounded. I will exhibit public key encryption schemes resilient to such
leakage. As time permits I will also mention extensions of these results
to _unbounded memory leakage in distributed settings_ (with Goldwasser and
Hazay).