Protecting Circuits from Leakage: the Computationally-Bounded and Noisy Cases
Speaker: Eran Tromer, TAU
Abstract:
Physical computational devices leak side-channel information that may,
and often does, reveal secret internal states. We present a general transformation that compiles any circuit into a new, functionally
equivalent circuit which is resilient against well-defined classes of leakage. Our constructions reduce the problem of shielding arbitrarily complex circuits to the problem of shielding a small component that is stateless and independent of the specific computation.
Our approach is based on modeling the adversary as a powerful observer that inspects the device via a limited measurement apparatus. The measurement apparatus can be limited in its accuracy (i.e., noise), or in its computational power. In the latter case, the construction leverages lower bounds on low complexity classes: for example, using lower bounds on AC0, we obtain a construction that is resilient to any leakage that can be computed by constant-depth circuits.
Joint work with Tal Rabin, Sebastian Faust, Leonid Reyzin and Vinod Vaikuntanathan.