

Communication Lower Bounds for Cryptographic Broadcast Protocols

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
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Broadcast Protocols

A broadcast protocol with sender S is considered secure if it satisfies the following properties:


- **Validity**: if the sender is honest and has input x , then $y = x$
- **Agreement**: every honest party outputs the same value y



Byzantine agreement: a closely related multi-input version

Setting

- Synchronous message passing
- Malicious (Byzantine) adversary
- Corruption timing:
 - **Static**: before the protocol begins
 - **Adaptive**: on-the-fly during the protocol
 - **Strongly adaptive**: “after the fact” message removal
 - **Weakly adaptive**: no “after the fact” removal



Playground of feasibility & impossibility

Feasibility

Resiliency

Rounds

Connectivity

Communication




async

sync




$t \geq n/3$

$t < n/3$




$< t + 1$

$\geq t + 1$



$< 2t + 1$

$\geq 2t + 1$



$o(n^2)$

$\Theta(n^2)$

Deterministic broadcast protocols



Not scalable

Let's lower our expectations

Clean & elegant results



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
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Security with high probability

Randomness & Cryptography



Security wrt PPT adversaries

Playground of feasibility & impossibility

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
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
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
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$o(n^2)$

$\Theta(n^2)$



[Ben-Or'83]
[Rabin'83]
async BA



[DS'83]
PKI + Sig
 $t < n$



[many]
exp constant
for $t = \Theta(n)$

These bounds held
for >20 years

Playground of feasibility & impossibility


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
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
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Communication complexity (partial)

Honest majority

- [KS'09] statically secure BA with $o(n^2)$ communication and $o(n)$ connectivity
- [BGT'13] used cryptography for $\text{polylog}(n)$ locality (max degree in induced communication graph)
- [BCG'21] balanced BA with $\tilde{O}(n)$ comm. ($\text{polylog}(n)$ bits per party)
- [Micali'17] & [ACDNPRS'19] unbalanced BA with $\tilde{O}(n)$ comm. against weakly adaptive
- **[ACDNPRS'19] security wrt t strongly-adaptive $\Rightarrow \Omega(t^2)$ messages**



Communication complexity (partial)

Dishonest majority

- All communication-efficient broadcast based on [DS'83] $O(n^2)$ messages and $O(n^3)$ communication (bare pki + sig)
- [CPS'20] for $t = \Theta(n)$ constructed broadcast with $\tilde{O}(n^2)$ communication against weakly adaptive (trusted pki + cryptography)
- [TLP'22] for $t = \Theta(n)$ constructed broadcast with $\tilde{O}(n^2)$ communication and $\tilde{O}(1)$ locality against static adaptive (bare pki + sig)



Starting point

	Setup	Resiliency (t)	Total comm	Locality (non-sender)
Strongly adaptive				
Weakly adaptive				
Static				

Starting point

	Setup	Resiliency (t)	Total comm	Locality (non-sender)	
Strongly adaptive	bare pki	$t < n$	$O(n^3)$	n	[DS'83]
	any	$\Theta(n)$	$\Omega(n^2)$	$\Omega(n)$	[ACDNPRS19]
Weakly adaptive					
Static					

Starting point

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Strongly adaptive	bare pki	$t < n$	$O(n^3)$	n	[DS'83]
	any	$\Theta(n)$	$\Omega(n^2)$	$\Omega(n)$	[ACDNPRS19]
Weakly adaptive	trusted pki	$\Theta(n)$	$\tilde{O}(n^2)$	$O(n)$	[CPS'20]
Static					

Starting point

	Setup	Resiliency (t)	Total comm	Locality (non-sender)	
Strongly adaptive	bare pki	$t < n$	$O(n^3)$	n	[DS'83]
	any	$\Theta(n)$	$\Omega(n^2)$	$\Omega(n)$	[ACDNPRS19]
Weakly adaptive	trusted pki	$\Theta(n)$	$\tilde{O}(n^2)$	$O(n)$	[CPS'20]
Static	any (deterministic)	$\Theta(n)$	$\Omega(n^2)$	$\Omega(n)$	[DR'85]
	bare pki	$\Theta(n)$	$\tilde{O}(n^2)$	$\tilde{O}(1)$	[TLP'22]

No lower bounds for randomized broadcast for static/weakly adaptive

Can we get $o(n^2)$ communication?

Yes! Under strong assumptions



- [CPS'20] use a **polylog-size committee** to run DS \Rightarrow small signature-chains (but messages are propagated in an all-to-all network)
- [TLP'22] use a **polylog-degree expander** to propagate all-to-all messages
- Together we get:

Thm 1: Let $0 < \epsilon < 1$ be a constant and $t = (1 - \epsilon)n$.

Assuming cryptography (signatures + VRF) and trusted-PKI setup

\exists statically t -secure broadcast with $\tilde{O}(n)$ communication and $\tilde{O}(1)$ locality

Can we do better?

An analog for Thm 1 with **more static corruptions**?

Thm 2: Let $\epsilon(n) \in o(1)$ and $t = (1 - \epsilon(n)) \cdot n$

For any (statically) t -secure broadcast, the message complexity is

$$\Omega\left(n \cdot \frac{1}{\epsilon(n)}\right)$$

Examples:

- $n - \frac{n}{\log^d n}$ corruptions (ie, $\epsilon(n) = \frac{1}{\log^d n}$) require $\Omega(n \cdot \log^d n)$ messages
- $n - \sqrt{n}$ corruptions (ie, $\epsilon(n) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}$) require $\Omega(n \cdot \sqrt{n})$ messages
- $n - c$ corruptions (ie, $\epsilon(n) = \frac{c}{n}$) require $\Omega(n^2)$ messages

Can we do better (#2)?

An analog for Thm 1 with a **constant fraction of adaptive corruptions**?

Recall that Thm 1 guarantees $\tilde{O}(1)$ locality

With adaptive corruptions the sender must talk to $t + 1$ (o/w gets isolated)

What about non-sender parties?

Thm 3: Let $0 < k < n/2$ and $t = n/2 + k$, let P_{i^*} be a non-sender, and let π be a weakly adaptive t -secure broadcast protocol. Then, there exists an adversary that can force P_{i^*} to talk to k parties.

E.g., for $t = 0.51 \cdot n$, the (non-sender) locality is $\Theta(n)$

Protocol design: ensure that each party has a path with high communication

Main Results


	Setup	Resiliency (t)	Total comm	Locality (non-sender)	
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Weakly adaptive	trusted pki	$\Theta(n)$	$\tilde{O}(n^2)$	$O(n)$	[CPS'20]
	any	$n/2 + k$		$> k$	Thm 3
Static	any (deterministic)	$\Theta(n)$	$\Omega(n^2)$	$\Omega(n)$	[DR'85]
	bare pki	$\Theta(n)$	$\tilde{O}(n^2)$	$\tilde{O}(1)$	[TLP'22]
	trusted pki	$\Theta(n)$	$\tilde{O}(n)$	$\tilde{O}(1)$	Thm 1
	any	$(1 - \epsilon(n))n$	$\Omega(n/\epsilon(n))$		Thm 2

High-level idea for Thm 2

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For any (statically) t -secure broadcast, the message complexity is


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
High-level idea for Thm 2

- Split all receivers to two subsets \mathcal{A} and \mathcal{B}
- Choose set $\mathcal{S} \subseteq \mathcal{A}$ of size $\epsilon(n) \cdot n - 1$ and a party $P^* \in \mathcal{B}$ and corrupt all others

\mathcal{A}




\mathcal{B}




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
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- **Lemma 1:** if P^* and \mathcal{S} do not communicate $\Rightarrow \mathcal{S}$ outputs 0 and P^* outputs 1




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
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High-level idea for Thm 2

- **Lemma 1:** if P^* and \mathcal{S} do not communicate $\Rightarrow \mathcal{S}$ outputs 0 and P^* outputs 1
- **Lemma 2:** P^* and \mathcal{S} do not communicate with noticeable probability

Subtle: communication patterns may depend on \mathcal{S} and P^*



Open Questions

Static: match the LB (e.g., for $\epsilon(n) = \log^{-d} n$ and $\epsilon(n) = \sqrt{n}$)

Static: sub-quadratic broadcast from weaker assumptions

Weakly adaptive: is there sub-quadratic broadcast?

Understand the limitations of cryptography in distributed systems

Thank You